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question McSwain on the stand, the citation for contempt was overruled.
The case is, therefore, of little or no value as precedent because of the
purely technical basis on which it was determined. It would seem that by
merely taking what the court considered to be proper steps in questioning, the documents would have to be revealed. The tenor of McSwain's
testimony indicates that this is hardly the interpretation which the FBI
placed on the regulation. Yet, in order to regain an untrammeled privilege
for departmental documents, it is only necessary for the Attorney General
to withdraw the supplement.
The initial point in the case follows the line of decisions allowing a
department head to determine the existence of privilege. With all deference to the department head, the litigant's interests ordinarily would not
be given adequate consideration. Even with the waiver principle the
rationale is unsatisfactory. In certain habeas corpus proceedings where evidence is crucial justice could well require that documents be made available. Similarly, in criminal actions in a state court, if the material were
of primary importance the public interest might best be served by having
the documents revealed. The issue should not depend on the fortuitous
presence of a technical waiver.
The extent of public interest in preserving the secrecy of official documents varies with the differing functions of the various agencies. It is
conceivable that the benefit in securing evidence in certain civil cases
might outweigh the importance of keeping documents of some agencies
secret. Additionally, where the government is prosecuting a case and the
defendant seeks evidence which is material, but not crucial, it might be
proper to refuse the documents without dismissing the prosecution. Such
problems demand a rule with fairness and flexibility. These qualities can
only be achieved by a restoration of the determination of privilege to the
trial judge.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
The Constitutionality of a Post Conviction Law-In the recent case of
People v. Dale, 92 N.E. (2d) 761 (IlM. 1950), the Illinois Supreme Court
had occasion to pass directly upon the constitutionality of the Illinois Post
Conviction Act. The defendant had been convicted under the Illinois
Habitual Crfininal Act and was serving a sentence in the penitentiary.
Alleging that he had been deprived of due process of law in the previous
proceeding, he sought relief under the Post Conviction Act (ll. Rev. Stat.,
1949, chap. 38, §§826-832).
Briefly, the Act provides that any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
may initiate proceedings in the court which tried and sentenced him to
determine whether there had been a substantial denial of his right to due
process of law, either under the Federal or Illinois Constitutions. In the
instant case, the defendant filed a petition in the Criminal Court of Cook
County, asserting that in the trial which led to his conviction he had been
aenied the right to summon witnesses in his defense. The state filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Post Conviction Act
was unconstitutional and the motion was sustained by the Criminal Court.
Upon the defendant's appeal the Illinois Supreme Court found little difficulty in disposing of the various arguments made by the state. The most
serious contention advanced by the State's Attorney against the Act's constitutionality was that it provided a rehearing on constitutional issues in
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causes which had been finally adjudicated, thus giving power to a nisi prius
court to set aside its own final judgments as well as those of the state
Supreme Court. The Court, however, found no merit in this argument,
stating that the new statutory remedy could not be utilized to obtain a
hearing upon claims of denial of constitutional rights which had already been
heard on their merits. "The question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner
will not be before the court on the post-conviction proceeding, but the
inquiry will be limited to constitutional issues not previously adjudicated."
The State's Attorney also argued that the legislation was prohibited
under the Illinois Constitution as class legislation in that it withheld the
remedy from "classes of persons imprisoned in jails, reformatories and
similar institutions and therefore its classification is unreasonable." To
refute this argument it was pointed out that the state constitution afforded
procedural safeguards to persons subject to penitentiary sentences not
available to those charged with lesser crimes. Thus it was not unreasonable
for the legislature to provide additional safeguards to those so singled out
by the constitution without any necessity of also making such remedies
available to minor offenders. The Court refused to countenance the argument that the protection of the Act did not extend to female felons imprisoned in the State Reformatory for Women or to convicted murderers who
were awaiting execution in the Cook. County jail. It held that the Act
should be interpreted in the spirit in which it was written rather than on
the basis of a technical reading of its exact letter.
A less important argument that prior to the Act there were adequate postconviction remedies was summarily dismissed as presenting no constitutional
issue. The Court pointed out that none of the extant remedies (habeas corpus,
coram nobis, or writ of error) were replaced by the new statute, and the mere
existence of these remedies did not prohibit the legislature from providing
additional ones if it felt that they were either needed or desirable.
The well known principle that the power of a state legislature was plenary
and need not be found in a constitutional provision was affirmed in this decision. (For a complete discussion of the Illinois Post Conviction Act, see Vol.
40, page 606 of this Journal.)
Admissibility of Admission by Silence of an Intoxicated Person; Admissibility of Dying Declaration Made Without Formalities-Recently the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, in State v. Rich, 58 S.E. (2d) 717 (N. C., 1950),
re-examined two well-known rules of evidence. Both the principles of
admission by silence and the admissibility of dying declarations were involved. Briefly, the facts were that the defendant "Shine" Rich was found
guilty of murder in the second degree and appealed on grounds of improper
admission of evidence. The evidence called into question arose under the
following circumstances: a deputy sheriff was called to the home of the
defendant and there found both the defendant and his wife, whom he had
beaten, lying on their bed. Rich was apparently "well under the influence," but sufficiently alert to smoke and later rise and kiss the victim as
she was carried away in an ambulance. The wife was in considerable pain
and, in answer to the witness' question, replied that "Shine did it." This
conversation was admitted into evidence, over objection, under the rule
that one accused in his presence must be prepared to deny or be deemed
to have admitted the accusation by his silence. The North Carolina Supreme
Court refused to allow the defense's contention that the defendant's con-
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dition was such as to prevent his rising to the occasion and denying the
allegations of his wife. On the second point of appeal, admission of the
dying declaration, the court found that the circumstances surrounding the
declaration were sufficient to permit its admission even though there was
no formality of a statement by the victim that she was in fear of imme-.
diate death. The holding was that, where there is evidence which would
permit the trial judge to arrive at an opinion that the circumstances surrounding the declaration was such as to fulfill the traditional requirements,
the declaration is admissible. The fact that there is also evidence tending
to show that it was not a true dying declaration is not sufficient for a
reviewing court to overturn the ruling. The rule applied seems very close
to that utilized in upholding rulings of administrative agencies when there
is some evidence to support a finding. A final ground of appeal was given
little attention, the court holding that there was no error in a trial judge
giving instructions which explained, in detail, the underlying reasons for
admission of dying declarations. (For a general discussion regarding admissions by silence, see Volume 40 at page 615 of this Journal;and regarding
dying declarations, see Volume 39 at page 646.)
Necessity of Verdict, Complete as to Elements of the Crime, in Larceny
Prosecution-In People v. Swinson, 92 N.E. (2d) 758 (Il., 1950), the grand
jury had, by a single indictment consisting of one count, charged both defendants jointly with larceny of corn valued at $147.00. The jury found each of
the defendants guilty in the manner and form charged in the indictment, but
the verdict failed to fix the value of the corn stolen. On appeal defendants
contended that it was necessary that the verdict state the value of the corn
taken to be in excess of $15.00 in order to support a sentence fixed by statute
for grand larceny. The People argued that since there was but one count in
the indictment and that the verdict found the defendants guilty of a crime
in the manner and form charged therein, the requirements of law were met.
In reversing the conviction and sentence of the trial court the Illinois'Supreme
Court noted that the value of the property taken is a material fact necessary
to establish the nature of the larceny charged since value is the criterion dis.tinguishing the different degrees of the crime. Therefore, the value of such
property must be found by the jury, on the basis of proof adduced at the trial,
and included in its verdict. Because in the instant case'the jury did not determine that the value of the corn taken was in excess of $15.00, the defendants
were guilty only of petit larceny. The statute does not provide a penitentiary
sentence for this crime, therefore the sentence was in error. Further, both
defendants had already served penitentiary sentences longer than the statutory maximum for the crime of petit larceny, consequently it was necessary to
reverse the conviction without a remand.
Admissibility of Uncommunicated threats in Establishing Self-Defense-In Gr ffln v. United States (D.C., 1950), the defendant had been found guilty
of murder despite his claim of self-defense. It later developed, however, that
a morgue attendant had found An open penknife in the trouser pocket of the
deceased, and although the prosecutor had known this fact, the defendant had
never been informed. The Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for the reason that the latter court had
affirmed the conviction and sentence without stating any finding on this ground
of appeal. On remand the Circuit Court of Appeals considered the questions before it to be: first, whether such uncommunicated threats were admissi-

